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PUTTING BOOMERS TO PASTURE: 
DOES THE 2010 MIPPA LEGISLATION 
REINFORCE THE NURSING HOME 
BIAS? 
 
ROBERT S. BLOINK* 
 
I. Introduction and Roadmap 
 
Unfunded health related costs are the greatest financial 
uncertainty facing the baby boom generation as they enter 
retirement years. The vast majority of those costs will relate to 
home and institutional based health care services provided in 
the last months of their lives.1 When presented with the choice 
of receiving such end-of-life care in a home based setting versus 
an institutionalized setting, almost every senior will opt for 
home based care.2 Prior to 2010, the Medigap at-home recovery 
benefit covered expenditures incurred in connection with in-
 
  * Professor Robert Bloink started out his career with the IRS’s Office of 
Chief Counsel. Before leaving the IRS for private practice, Mr. Bloink 
established himself internally as one of the leading government experts on 
the taxation of structured finance and insurance products. 
Mr. Bloink’s private practice involved wealth transfer and succession 
planning for high net worth families. Over the past decade, Mr. Bloink has 
worked with producers to place over $1.4 billion in structured finance 
solutions, and more than $1.0 billion of death benefits. 
In addition to his role as senior editor for National Underwriters, Mr. Bloink 
has served as an adjunct law professor at numerous U.S. law schools. Most 
recently Mr. Bloink is serving as a Visiting Assistant Professor of Tax Law at 
the University of South Dakota Law School. 
1. Samuel Marshall et al., The Risk of Out-of-Pocket Health Care 
Expenditure at End of Life 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 16170, 2010), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16170.pdf?new_window=1; see also Lisa R. 
Shugarman et al., Differences in Medicare Expenditures During the Last 3 
Years of Life, 19(2) J. GEN. INTERNAL MED., 127, 127-35 (2004). 
2. Amanda J. Lehning & Michael J. Austin, Long-Term Care in the 
United States: Policy Themes and Promising Practices, 53 J. GERONTOLOGICAL 
SOC. WORK 43, 50 (2009). 
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home skilled medical care covered by a Medicare policy,3 such 
as personal care services that many seniors require in order to 
avoid a nursing home stay. The at-home recovery benefit was 
eliminated by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and 
Providers Act (“MIPPA”) in 2010.4 The Supreme Court took a 
decidedly different approach regarding access to home based 
health care options for this Medicaid-eligible senior population 
in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring.5 The Olmstead decision 
acknowledged the long standing bias toward providing end-of-
life health care services in an institutionalized setting, 
typically a nursing home, and, in an effort to have more of 
these Medicaid services provided in-home, required that “public 
entit[ies] . . . administer . . . programs . . . in the most 
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified 
individuals with disabilities.”6 Through this “integrated care” 
mandate, the Supreme Court recognized that the unjustified 
segregation of poor seniors in institutions was discrimination 
and that home and community based services (“HCBS”) care 
options must be provided where appropriate and reasonable in 
light of the patient’s needs.7 However, it is the engrained 
nursing home bias that non-Medicaid-eligible middle class 
boomers are likely to fall victim to, despite their stated 
intentions to the contrary. 
Because administering end-of-life care in a nursing home 
setting has become the default in the United States, today 
current retirees who fail to make affirmative decisions about 
how and where their end-of-life care will be administered will 
have little choice but to receive long-term care in an 
 
3. While all seniors aged 65 and over are eligible for Medicare, only 
those with very limited financial resources qualify for Medicaid coverage. 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
MEDICARE AND OTHER HEALTH BENEFITS: YOUR GUIDE TO WHO PAYS FIRST 8 
(2011), available at http://www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/02179.pdf. 
Though the asset threshold for Medicaid qualification varies across states, in 
most states, only those with assets valued at under $2,000 will qualify. 
Mariacristina De Nardi et al., Medicaid and the Elderly, 36 ECON. PERSP., 17, 
20 (2012). 
4. Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-275, 122 Stat. 2494 (2008). 
5. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
6. Id. at 592 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2012)). 
7. See id. at 597. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/4
BLOINK FINAL 2/28/2013 10:08 PM 
154 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
institutional setting. Failure to affirmatively engage in 
planning for end-of-life care choices is often simply a byproduct 
of limited information and even less professional guidance 
available regarding such decisions. This article seeks to explore 
what lessons can be learned from how Medicaid end-of-life 
health care services are provided to the poor post-Olmstead, 
and how these lessons can be applied to middle class and upper 
middle class boomers. The article equally seeks to address how 
such lessons can be integrated into a meaningful dialogue with 
retiring boomers in a fashion that encourages discussion and 
decisions regarding end-of-life health care, as opposed to 
leaving such tough calls for surviving adult children. 
To this end, Part II of this article begins by examining the 
hurdles seniors face in accessing HCBS after the defunding of 
the Medigap at-home recovery option in 2010, taking into 
account the difficulties involved in planning for long-term care 
that are caused by significant cost variances depending on the 
community in which the care is provided.8 This section further 
explores the impact of informal care provided by family 
members on the cost and effectiveness of long-term care 
performed in the home. 
Part III provides a summary of the historical background 
of long-term care in the United States and explores the genesis 
and perpetuation of the bias toward providing end-of-life care 
in an institutional setting, despite the high costs of nursing 
home care, leading up to the integrated care mandate handed 
down by the Supreme Court in Olmstead.9 In Part IV, the 
varying degrees to which states have implemented the 
Olmstead mandate are examined to provide an empirical 
analysis of the cost-savings and reduction in nursing home 
admission rates that can be realized through effective and 
widespread implementation of HCBS programs.10 Spending on 
long-term care in states with underdeveloped HCBS programs 
is compared to expenditures in states offering comprehensive 
programs to determine the overall effect of increasing access to 
HCBS. 
 
8. See discussion infra Part II. 
9. See discussion infra Part III. 
10. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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Part V identifies the planning gap that exists because of 
the reluctance of both advisors and clients to discuss end-of-life 
care.11 This section recognizes the often-conflicting motivations 
of financial advisors and attorneys, as well as the disinclination 
of clients toward discussing the end of their lives, both of which 
can lead to a joint failure to develop effective strategies for 
funding end-of-life care. 
Part VI aims to encourage advisors and clients to ignite 
the dialogue on end-of-life planning.12 It discusses the possible 
imposition of filial responsibility upon adult children for the 
long-term care expenses of their elderly parents and suggests 
that selective enforcement of filial support statutes could 
promote financial preparedness among baby boomer retirees. 
This section also raises the notion that fiduciary liability may 
be a motivating force that could persuade advisors to initiate 
the planning dialogue. With both sides motivated to engage in 
fulsome planning for end-of-life choices, this article 
hypothesizes that this planning dialogue can be transformed 
from one that advisors avoid and clients recoil from into a 
conversation that imparts a message of empowerment and 
hope among seniors who can develop the tools necessary to 
control the course of their own end-of-life care. 
 
II. Access to HCBS 
 
The longstanding bias toward providing end-of-life health 
care in an institutional setting has been perpetuated by the 
government’s elimination of the at-home recovery coverage 
relied upon by many seniors using HCBS for skilled medical 
care. Prior to the 2010 amendments to Medicare, retirees were 
provided with a wider range of coverage options and were thus 
able to exercise a greater degree of control over whether they 
received cost-effective HCBS recovery care versus substantially 
more expensive institutionalized rehabilitative care after a 
hospitalization.13 Medigap policies, which are federally 
 
11. See discussion infra Part V. 
12. See discussion infra Part VI. 
13. Health Reform Mandates Changes for Medigap Policies, CENTER. FOR 
MEDICARE ADVOC., INC., http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/2011/01/07/health-
reform-mandates-changes-for-medigap-policies/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012); 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/4
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standardized insurance policies purchased through private 
insurance companies to supplement traditional Medicare 
policies, provided an optional at-home recovery benefit prior to 
2010.14 In 2010, the MIPPA revised the federal standards to 
eliminate the at-home recovery coverage provided by certain 
Medigap policies, dramatically limiting the availability of 
HCBS for many seniors.15 Because these Medigap policies are 
federally standardized, they provide only the medical coverage 
mandated by the federal rules even though the policies are 
purchased from private insurance companies.16 This means 
that non-indigent seniors bear the burden of payment for 
expenses not specifically mandated by these one-size-fits-all 
policies. 
Several of these Medigap policies were required to provide 
at-home recovery coverage prior to 2010 as an optional method 
for funding the personal care services that are often required to 
assist seniors with activities of daily living (“ADLs”)17 while 
they receive in-home medical care funded by traditional 
Medicare policies.18 While Medigap and, in certain cases, 
traditional Medicare policies, continue to cover much of the in-
home medical care required by seniors, assistance with 
performing ADLs is often essential to the ability of elderly 
 
Genworth 2012 Cost of Care Survey, GENWORTH FIN., INC. (Mar. 13, 2012), 
http://www.genworth.com/content/non_navigable/corporate/about_genworth/i
ndustry_expertise/cost_of_care.html [hereinafter Genworth 2012 Survey]. The 
Genworth 2012 survey provides an interactive tool that allows for effective 
comparison between the cost of HCBS care and institutionalized care in any 
given state. For example, in New York State the cost of a home health aide is 
approximately $50,336 annually, while the annual cost for a private nursing 
home room is estimated to be $123,005. 
14. Health Reform Mandates Changes for Medigap Policies, CTR. FOR 
MEDICARE ADVOCACY, INC., 
http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/2011/01/07/health-reform-mandates-
changes-for-medigap-policies/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). 
15. Id. 
16. See id. 
17. ADLs are those daily activities that are considered critical to 
independent living, and include activities such as “bathing, dressing, eating . 
. . and toileting.” Kenneth E. Covinsky et al., Loss of Independence in 
Activities of Daily Living in Older Adults Hospitalized with Medical Illnesses: 
Increased Vulnerability with Age, 51 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 451, 451 (2003). 
18. See Health Reform Mandates Changes for Medigap Policies, supra 
note 14. 
5
BLOINK FINAL 2/28/2013 10:08 PM 
2013] PUTTING BOOMERS TO PASTURE 157 
patients to function independently in their homes.19 
Seniors who are admitted into a nursing home, of course, 
receive assistance with ADLs because they are no longer living 
independently. Institutional care, by its nature, provides a 
level of supervision with ADLs that many seniors require. 
Since the MIPPA defunded coverage for personal care services 
for patients who are no longer able to perform ADLs 
independently, supervised nursing home living is often the only 
available option. Because the ability of seniors to perform 
ADLs is so critical,20 the in-home skilled medical care covered 
by Medicare policies is often worth little for those who are 
unable to perform ADLs without assistance. 
Therefore, access to HCBS is limited because of the gaps in 
coverage that exist for elderly patients relying on government 
health insurance programs to pay for care.21 While Medicare 
recipients are permitted to choose where their post-
hospitalization medical care will take place, Medicare and 
Medigap policies no longer cover non-medical support from 
health aides that promote autonomy among seniors by 
 
19. Covinsky et al., supra note 17, at 452. 
20. See Covinsky et al., supra note 17. 
21. Terence Ng et al., Medicare and Medicaid in Long-Term Care, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 22, 23-24 (2010). Traditional Medicare policies provide limited 
coverage for skilled care or therapy services in the home following a 
hospitalization. While all seniors over age sixty-five qualify for Medicare 
coverage, long-term care benefits are limited because they are only available 
for a specified period of time (typically, full coverage lasts only twenty days, 
with partial coverage beginning on day twenty-one). Richard L. Kaplan, 
Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 407, 420 (2007). Medicaid coverage of long-term care services, 
on the other hand, is limited to those “medically needy” patients who have 
spent-down their assets to state mandated levels (typically around $2,000). 
See Sudipto Banerjee, Effects of Nursing Home Stays on Household Portfolios, 
EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, June 2012, at 1, available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_06-2012_No372_NrsHmStys.pdf. 
While states are permitted to provide more generous HCBS benefits, few 
states have implemented comprehensive and fully functional HCBS programs 
to supplement nursing home benefits. Once a patient qualifies for Medicaid 
coverage, however, there is no time limit to the length of time he or she can 
claim benefits. Medicaid pays for institutional services provided in a nursing 
home, in-home skilled medical care and the personal care services attendant 
to in-home medical coverage for those medically needy seniors who qualify for 
coverage. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/4
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providing the in-home personal assistance that is usually 
required during a post-hospitalization recovery period.22 
Medicaid programs will pay for long-term care in an institution 
or in the home, and will also pay for the required personal care 
services for those seniors who require assistance with ADLs, 
but only for the medically needy who are able to qualify for 
coverage.23 This MIPPA defunding has effectively forced many 
seniors to opt for recovery in nursing homes because they 
require non-medical assistance in order to safely live 
unsupervised while using HCBS options, and such assistance is 
no longer covered under any Medicare or Medigap policy.24 
Increased reliance on private funds for HCBS financing 
has generated a dilemma for those retirement-age seniors who 
attempt to plan for unfunded post-retirement medical 
expenses. Although financing the high cost of long-term care 
presents a challenge in any state, as expenditures for HCBS 
have grown by 235% in the last twenty years,25 HCBS and 
nursing home cost variance among states is often significant. 
For example, when actuarial models developed by financial 
professionals are used to compare projected post-retirement 
medical expenses for a sixty-five-year-old couple living in New 
Jersey to the projected costs for a similarly-situated couple 
living in Hawaii, the variance is 33.7 percent.26 Such large cost 
variances between states complicate effective planning for 
financing post-retirement medical expenses, especially 
considering the mobility of retirees today. 
The complications inherent in projecting post-retirement 
medical expenses often result in seniors who are financially 
unprepared to fund professional HCBS. Approximately eighty 
 
22. Health Reform Mandates Changes for Medigap Policies, supra note 
14. 
23. Ng et al., supra note 21, at 23-24. 
24. Health Reform Mandates Changes for Medigap Policies, supra note 
14. 
25. THOMAS DAVIDOFF, LONG-TERM CARE HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 2 
(2012). 
26. Dan McGrath, States Ranking When It Comes to Healthcare Costs in 
Retirement, HEALTHVIEW SERVICES (June 9, 2012), 
http://www.hvsfinancial.com/2012/06/states-ranking-when-it-comes-to-
healthcare-costs-in-retirement. 
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percent of seniors receiving HCBS rely upon unpaid family 
members to provide some HCBS, whether on a full time or 
sporadic basis, in order to avoid institutionalization.27 In fact, a 
2009 study found that only one in four seniors who receive care 
at home rely upon any form of paid care.28 Though adult 
children may be able to provide a portion of the care required 
by their elderly parents, the limitations inherent to provision of 
this informal care often mean that admission to a nursing 
home eventually becomes the norm.29 
Though informal care provided by adult children and other 
family members does not per se create a direct financial burden 
upon seniors or their families, the caregivers almost always 
experience lost opportunity costs, such as lost wages or time 
spent with children or spouses, when they must allocate a 
portion of their time to providing care.30 Because forty-two 
percent of informal care is provided by adult children, rather 
than the senior’s elderly spouse,31 the work, familial, and social 
commitments of these younger caregivers limit the level of care 
that can be provided. Unsurprisingly, studies have found that 
adult children who experience greater lost opportunity costs 
are much less likely to be able to provide sufficient levels of 
care to their elderly parents over the long term.32 From a policy 
perspective, the inherent limitations on adult children who 
provide informal long-term care services for their elderly 
parents make development of effective professional care 
 
27. Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and 
Community Care: Lessons from Medicaid's History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 
962 (2010) (citing Boon or Bane? Examining the Value of Long-Term Care 
Insurance: Hearing on Role of Private Insurance in Long-Term Care Before S. 
Spec. Comm. On Aging, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (testimony of Diane Rowland, 
Sc.D., Executive Vice President, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation), 
available at http://aging.senate.gov/publications/632009.pdf. 
28. Brenda Spillman, Financial Preparedness for Long-Term Care Needs 
in Old Age, in CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS: LIFESPAN 
PERSPECTIVES 239, 241 (Douglas J. Lamdin ed., 2012). 
29. See Jacey J. Vaughan & Nina M. Silverstein, Leaving Home Care: 
Decision Making, Risk Scenarios & Services Gaps in the Home Care System, 
GERONTOLOGY INST. PUBLICATIONS, Dec. 2011, at 1, 18. 
30. David Byrne et al., Formal Home Health Care, Informal Care, and 
Family Decision Making, 50 INT’L ECON. REV. 1205, 1209 (2009). 
31. Id. at 1218. 
32. Id. at 1238-39. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/4
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services the only responsible method of providing safe and 
effective in-home care. Developing methods for funding this 
professional care is therefore necessary to allow seniors to 
access comprehensive in-home care services. 
If funding methods are not developed so as to allow seniors 
access to professional in-home care, institutionalization will 
continue to be the only feasible option for many retirees. To 
illustrate further, eighty-one percent of respondents in a 
University of Massachusetts survey found that a lack of 
around-the-clock supervision was the largest gap in the HCBS 
system, while seventy percent found that a lack of informal 
support was one of the most common triggers to nursing home 
admission.33 When informal familial caregivers become unable 
to provide the care necessary to maintain elderly family 
members in their own homes and professional in-home care 
cannot be financed, nursing home admission becomes the 
default solution.34 
Once a senior citizen is admitted into a nursing home, the 
likelihood that he or she will return home and receive home-
based care becomes remote.35 Nursing home care becomes the 
default modality for admitted seniors, largely because the 
dilemma of how to pay for institutionally-based care typically 
disappears very quickly.36 Because the average annual cost for 
a nursing home in the United States is approximately $75,555 
per year,37 most seniors admitted to nursing homes quickly 
spend-down their assets and qualify for Medicaid’s need-based 
coverage.38 In contrast, the challenge of how to pay for home-
based care remains. 
The defunding of HCBS has increased the likelihood that 
admission to a nursing home will become the solution for 
seniors who are unable to live independently because, as assets 
are quickly spent-down, the government steps in with Medicaid 
 
33. Vaughan & Silverstein, supra note 29, at 6. 
34. See id. at 18. 
35. Alison Patrucco Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A 
Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a System of Principled 
Decision-Making in Long-Term Care, 41 EMORY L.J. 633, 647 n.44 (1992). 
36. See Banerjee, supra note 21, at 4. 
37. Id. 
38. See id. at 14. 
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coverage to fund this end-of-life care expense.39 This engrained 
response to end-of-life health care perpetuates the bias toward 
administering care in an institutional setting instead of using 
HCBS where appropriate. 
 
III. Historical Perspective 
 
For most of the twentieth century, the social bias toward 
providing end-of-life care in institutional settings perpetuated 
the entrenchment of nursing homes in the United States. The 
bias toward nursing home care began in the nineteenth 
century, when almshouses were created to house poor patients 
who suffered from diseases for which there was no known 
cure.40 Though patients were not always treated for their 
ailments, the almshouse served as a place to isolate them from 
the larger community.41 
After the Great Depression, the government developed the 
federal Old-Age Assistance (OAA) program that discouraged 
the use of almshouses by providing federal funding for state 
programs focused on long-term care, but only if the recipient 
patients were not currently “inmates” in an almshouse.42 This 
incentivized states to develop “rest homes” and “convalescent 
homes” to replace the almshouses as the primary form of 
institutional care.43 
The OAA also created a disincentive to in-home care 
provided informally by a patient’s family members, because the 
provision of federal funding removed the stigma previously 
attached to institutional care in an almshouse. The negative 
connotations that accompanied the idea of an almshouse as a 
“poorhouse,” where the patients often suffered from diseases 
that were perceived to be incurable, such as alcoholism and 
mental infirmity, encouraged many families to avoid 
institutionalizing their elderly relatives to avoid being 
associated with these stigmatisms.44 Nursing homes, however, 
 
39. Id. 
40. Watson, supra note 27, at 940-41. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 943. 
43. Id. at 944. 
44. See generally id. at 940 (affirming that the “home atmosphere was 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/4
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were federally funded and able to offer real treatment, 
removing many of the negative associations that families of 
elderly patients had associated with institutional care prior to 
their development.45 
After Congress amended the Social Security Act in the 
1950s, federal and state spending on nursing homes increased 
to nearly $450 million annually.46 The Kerr-Mills Act, which 
was the predecessor to Medicaid,47 was enacted in the 1960s 
and, though it was technically permitted to fund both nursing 
home care and HCBS, it offered direct reimbursement to 
nursing homes instead of to individual recipients, which 
encouraged the widespread growth of private sector for-profit 
nursing homes that had the resources to aggressively seek out 
government reimbursement.48 
As the number of private sector nursing facilities 
expanded, institutional care became even more engrained in 
the medical industry by providing an easy solution for hospitals 
caring for seniors who required personal care services more 
than skilled medical assistance.49 Because nursing homes had 
become so prevalent in the industry, medical professionals 
could release patients into nursing homes with the assurance 
that their care would continue to be funded by the 
government.50 
Under Medicaid, which succeeded Kerr-Mills as the 
primary conduit for funding medical care for the poor, all states 
developed long-term care programs to assist the “medically 
needy,” causing Medicaid spending on nursing home care to 
increase from approximately $800 million to $4.2 billion in the 
 
viewed as the ideal place to be cared for . . . [and] [p]overty, disability, and 
illness were viewed as moral failings”). 
45. Id. at 960. 
46. Id. at 945 (citing ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE 
MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 34 (Transaction Publishers 
2d ed. 2003) (1974)). 
47. Laura D. Hermer, Federal/State Tensions in Fulfilling Medicaid’s 
Purpose, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 615, 618 (2012). 
48. Id. at 951. 
49. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, REINVENTING CARE: ASSISTED LIVING IN 
NEW YORK CITY 50-51 (2003). 
50. See id at 51. 
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1960s.51 Encouraged by Medicaid’s requirement that aid 
recipients be “medically needy,” the long-term care market 
became saturated with for-profit nursing homes that fueled the 
rapidly increasing cost of providing institutional care because 
once a patient’s assets were spent down to the poverty level, 
Medicaid stepped in to fund nursing home payments 
indefinitely.52 Today, almost two-thirds of nursing homes are 
operated privately as for-profit entities53—and these entities 
have an incentive to cause their patients to spend-down assets 
quickly because, once a patient has exhausted his or her 
personal resources, there is often little choice but to remain in 
the nursing home permanently. 
The Supreme Court recognized this decades old funding 
and societal bias toward nursing home care in its Olmstead 
decision.54 In Olmstead, the plaintiffs were two mentally 
disabled women who had been receiving care in an institutional 
setting.55 Their physicians had found that they could receive 
appropriate care in a home-based setting, but the women 
remained institutionalized despite their requests to be 
transferred into HCBS programs.56 They filed suit alleging that 
the state’s failure to transfer them into the community-based 
program, despite the physician’s finding that such care was 
appropriate, was discrimination under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.57 
The Court agreed that de facto institutionalization can 
constitute discrimination, holding that: 
 
[S]tates are required to provide community-
based treatment for persons with mental 
 
51. Id. at 49. 
52. Nathalie D. Martin & Elizabeth Rourke, Les Jeux Ne Sont Pas Faits: 
The Right to Dignified Long-Term Care in the Face of Industry-Wide 
Financial Failure, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 149 (2000). 
53. David G. Stevenson & David C. Grabowski, Private Equity 
Investment and Nursing Home Care: Is it a Big Deal?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1399, 
1399 (2008), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/5/1399.full.html. 
54. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
55. Id. at 593. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/4
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disabilities when the State’s treatment 
professionals determine that such placement is 
appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose 
such treatment, and the placement can be 
reasonably accommodated, taking into account 
the resources available to the State and the 
needs of others with mental disabilities.58 
 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted the importance of 
avoiding the negative effects that come from isolating an 
individual from the community and diminishing his or her 
contact with family and friends.59 
Through this decision, the Supreme Court sought to 
encourage investment in HCBS by recognizing that 
professionally administered HCBS can provide a level of care 
comparable to that found in nursing homes without the 
negative side effects faced by the institutionalized elderly. 
Through increased use of HCBS, end-of-life care can be 
provided while maintaining the economic and social 
independence of the patient and without isolating the elderly 
from their families and communities.60 
Because many elderly nursing home residents primarily 
require personal care services, as opposed to more expensive 
skilled medical care, HCBS can help reduce the rate at which 
assets are spent-down and, therefore, avoid trapping seniors in 
nursing homes. The integrated care mandate handed down 
through the Olmstead decision represented the first step away 
from the nursing home bias perpetuated throughout the 
twentieth century. Olmstead recognized that simply because 
nursing homes are an easy option does not mean that they 
represent the most effective or cost-efficient route to providing 
end-of-life care.61 
 
 
 
 
58. Id. at 607. 
59. Id. at 601. 
60. Id. at 600-01. 
61. See id. 
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IV. Empirical Analysis of Impact of Greater Access to HCBS 
 
In the thirteen years since the Supreme Court decided 
Olmstead, states have had ample opportunity to implement 
appropriate HCBS programs to comply with the Court’s 
integrated care mandate. However, states have implemented 
HCBS programs to increase integration of patients within their 
communities at varying paces.62 This tiered approach to 
implementing HCBS programs provides a unique opportunity 
to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of HCBS programs 
in their varying stages of development. By comparing empirical 
data from states with newly-formed or nonexistent HCBS 
programs with data from states maintaining fully functional 
HCBS programs, it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of 
HCBS in reducing admission rates to institutions, as well as 
determining dollars spent on this institutionalized care. 
Empirical studies have shown that spending on long-term 
care initially increases when states aggressively seek to fulfill 
the Olmstead integrated care mandate, which can be expected 
because these states are establishing new programs and adding 
services that were previously unavailable.63 In states where 
HCBS programs were in the development phases, overall state 
spending on long-term care increased by approximately 
24.2%.64 
This spending increase is logical because, as HCBS become 
more widely accessible, seniors who had previously relied upon 
the unpaid services of their adult children will begin to 
supplant these services with professional home-based care 
providers as they become available. Further, the increase in 
spending is only temporary, as studies have shown that where 
states have spent diligently to implement the Olmstead 
integrated care mandate, the cost of long-term care actually 
declines by about 7.9% once HCBS programs are fully 
 
62. See, e.g., Elizabeth P. Allen, The ACA’s Medicaid HCBS Long-Term 
Care-Reforms: Potential Positive Impact on the Fiscal Health of the States, 
243 ELDER L. ADVISORY 1 (2011). 
63. Stephen H. Kaye et al., Do Noninstitutional Long-Term Care 
Services Reduce Medicaid Spending?, 28 HEALTH AFF. 262, 265 (2009). 
64. Id. 
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established.65 
Widespread availability of HCBS programs also decreases 
overall spending on nursing homes specifically, suggesting that 
seniors who are presented with the choice between 
institutional care and HCBS are more likely to choose HCBS 
and remain in their homes.66 In recent years, nursing home 
spending grew by about 3.4% in states with poorly developed 
HCBS programs, while spending on nursing homes declined by 
15.3% in states that offered widespread access to HCBS.67 
While studies have found that nursing home spending 
remained stable for the years immediately following 
implementation of comprehensive HCBS programs, it began to 
decline in the fourth year following expansion and continued to 
decline in every subsequent year.68 This suggests that as HCBS 
programs become established and recognized within the 
community, seniors begin to take advantage of cost-effective in-
home care in order to avoid costly institutionalization in a 
nursing home. It is, therefore, not surprising that states with 
well-established HCBS programs are able to reduce their 
overall spending on long-term care, given the extremely high 
cost of nursing home care. 
The three-year delay in recognizing cost savings on long-
term care spending is to be expected, because while widely 
accessible HCBS will delay or reduce admission into nursing 
homes, it will not increase the rate at which seniors are 
released from nursing homes.69 Because of this, states 
experience the additional expenses associated with developing 
and maintaining new HCBS programs and must still spend on 
nursing home care for those seniors who reside in an 
institutional setting when the HCBS programs become 
available.70 While additional seniors may begin to take 
advantage of HCBS services to decrease their reliance upon 
unpaid, informal care provided by family members, seniors who 
have already spent down their assets to qualify for Medicaid-
 
65. Id. 
66. See id. 
67. Id. at 265. 
68. Id. at 269. 
69. Id. at 270-71. 
70. See id. 
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funded institutional care will remain in these nursing homes, 
often for the remainder of their life expectancies. States will, 
therefore, experience a lag in recognizing significant cost 
savings until this overlap is diminished.71 
By implementing the Olmstead integrated care mandate 
and providing the Medicaid-eligible population with the choice 
of in-home care, states eventually become able to reduce 
spending on long-term care by decreasing the rate of admission 
to nursing homes.72 The balance of this article assumes that if 
the non-indigent Medicare-eligible population had funding 
options similar to Medicaid-eligible seniors, they would, 
analogously, choose to take greater advantages of HCBS 
programs. 
By using HCBS, these seniors would be admitted to 
institutional care facilities less frequently, increasing the 
period during which they are able to live free of Medicaid 
support.73 Perhaps even more importantly, greater access to 
HCBS will provide an incentive for seniors to engage their 
financial advisors and plan for funding their own end-of-life 
care in an effort to avoid institutionalization and remain in 
their homes. 
In light of the 2010 MIPPA defunding of the Medigap at-
home recovery option, encouraging seniors to plan and prepare 
for financing their own in-home care is now more important 
than ever. The advice of financial advisors and attorneys can be 
invaluable to middle class retirees who may be planning to rely 
on government funding for their end-of-life care. If avoiding 
institutionalization is the goal for these retirees, planning to 
privately fund HCBS must become a priority. Unfortunately, 
many who are approaching retirement age lack the 
professional guidance necessary to recognize this need and, as 
such, remain financially unprepared to take advantage of the 
HCBS options that would allow them to continue living 
independently in their own homes while receiving long-term 
care. 
 
71. Id. at 271. 
72. Id. 
73. See Naoko Muramatsu et al., Risk of Nursing Home Admission 
Among Older Americans: Does States’ Spending on Home- and Community-
Based Services Matter?, 62 J. GERONTOL SOC. SCI. S169, S171 (2007). 
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V. Absence of Guidance 
 
Many financial advisors and attorneys today have a 
difficult time approaching their clients to discuss planning 
strategies for funding end-of-life care, whether in an institution 
or in the client’s own home. Planning for end-of-life care has 
negative connotations for clients, who naturally recoil from 
discussing the end of their lives. Because financial planners 
and attorneys frequently fail to initiate the dialogue necessary 
to develop a plan for financing end-of-life care, a substantial 
gap in retirement planning has developed, leaving many 
retirees unprepared to fund their own post-retirement medical 
expenses. Frequently, the cadre of advisors employed by 
today’s retirees simply has conflicting focuses that tend to 
negate the importance of planning for end-of-life care.74 The 
professional training and engrained focus of the respective 
advisor groups leads to an embedded bias toward failing to 
adequately consider the cost of this care. 
Financial planners commonly focus on allocating a client’s 
assets so as to provide sufficient retirement income to fund 
post-retirement living expenses. Projecting end-of-life 
unfunded health care expenses is more difficult, often because 
the mobility of seniors today makes it challenging for an 
advisor to determine the proper funding levels, as costs for 
medical and long-term care vary widely from state to state. For 
example, unfunded post-retirement health care costs 
anticipated by a New Jersey resident are more than one-third 
as high as those projected for a similarly situated senior citizen 
living in Hawaii.75 The difficulty inherent in making an 
 
74. See Joseph F. Coughlin & Lisa A. D’Ambrosio, Seven Myths of 
Financial Planning and Baby Boomer Retirement, 14 J. FIN. SERVICES 
MARKETING 83 (2009), (describing questions related to healthcare and long-
term care as a new variety of questions facing financial professionals today); 
Betty Meredith & John R. Salter, How Prepared Is the Retirement Industry 
for Meeting the Needs of Retiring American Workers?, 17 FIN. SERVICES REV. 
87 (2008) (identifying the traditional focus of retirement planning as wealth 
accumulation and the need for financial advisors to focus more heavily on 
post-retirement planning). 
75. McGrath, supra note 26. HVS has developed a tool that allows 
financial planners to input client data such as age, general level of health and 
location in order to determine their estimated costs for end of life care. This 
model projects that a seventy year old New Jersey resident will require 
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accurate estimation of these post-retirement medical expenses 
often results in financial planners altogether ignoring or 
underestimating these expenses.76 
Similarly, too often attorneys’ professional focus as they 
advise new retirees is not primarily aimed at helping seniors 
plan for financing end-of-life medical expenses. Trust and 
estate attorneys primarily focus on the disposition of a client’s 
assets post-mortem or on the tax issues surrounding a client’s 
estate plan. If an attorney specializing in trusts and estates 
does provide guidance on planning for post-retirement medical 
care, the discussion is commonly limited to advice regarding 
the execution of a durable health care power of attorney.77 A 
durable health care power of attorney, while useful in some 
circumstances, provides little opportunity for seniors to direct 
the course of their own end-of-life care, as it instead serves to 
delegate control over medical decisions to another in the event 
that the senior becomes incapable of making his or her own 
choices.78 
Elder care attorneys are typically the only group of 
attorney-advisors who commonly discuss end-of-life care 
choices with their clients. Despite these conversations, it is 
sometimes the case that when elder care attorneys advise their 
clients, they may tend to tilt the discussion toward Medicaid 
planning as a solution to the problem of financing end-of-life 
care.79 Though this is not the only approach used to account for 
end-of-life choices, it is one that is commonly employed. As a 
policy matter, this approach is suspect because Medicaid 
planning focuses on creating artificial indigence in order to 
 
approximately $465,000 in today’s dollars to fund medical and long-term care 
expenses of just over $1 million over his anticipated remaining lifespan. In 
Florida, a similarly situated senior would require only $372,000 in today’s 
dollars to fund roughly $785,000 in medical and long-term care expenses. 
These variances can make it difficult for a financial planner to assist his or 
her clients in planning for end of life care if they do not have access to a 
comparable planning tool. 
76. Id. 
77. See, e.g., Maralee Buttery Vezie, Some Estate Planning 
Fundamentals (With Forms), 42 PRAC. LAW. 67, 76 (1996). 
78. See id. at 76-77. 
79. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, Medicaid Asset Planning by the Elderly: A 
Policy View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 4 REAL PROP. PROB. 
& TR. J. 1, 19 (1989). 
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shift responsibility for financing end-of-life care to the 
government. 
At its core, Medicaid planning involves shifting a client’s 
assets into trusts and other vehicles to create artificial 
indigence so that the client will qualify for Medicaid benefits.80 
Once a senior is indigent and qualifies for Medicaid benefits, he 
or she becomes eligible for Medicaid-financed nursing home 
care, which often eliminates access to many in-home care 
options because in-home care, by definition, requires the senior 
to fund an independent lifestyle. While Medicaid will cover the 
personal care services that a senior may need, it will not fund 
general living expenses that the senior will require to maintain 
his or her home. 
It is questionable whether this approach to end-of-life care 
planning is the most effective or appropriate, in that it 
encourages seniors to relinquish the responsibility for financing 
their own post-retirement medical expenses. These seniors, 
who in many circumstances are otherwise fully capable of 
planning and paying for their own end-of-life care with the 
proper guidance, are instead encouraged to rely on government 
aid. 
Though shifting these health care expenses to the state 
obviously provides a quantifiable benefit to the client, who 
becomes assured that the government will step in to fund his or 
her end-of-life care, it is doubtful whether this provides the 
most effective planning solution. By rendering themselves 
artificially indigent in order to qualify for Medicaid, these 
seniors relinquish control over their ability to access HCBS 
because the course of their care defaults to the state guidelines 
for Medicaid coverage. These state guidelines, as discussed 
above, are biased toward the provision of long-term care in an 
institutional setting, which is exactly what most seniors would 
rather avoid. 
Essentially, the mission of most advisors conflicts with the 
need to assist clients in forming strategies to finance end-of-life 
medical expenses. Allocating scarce assets to fund end-of-life 
care arguably diverges from the primary mission of a financial 
planner, which is to maximize retirement living expenses. 
 
80. See generally id. 
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Though many financial planners do attempt to account for 
these unfunded medical expenses, the inherent difficulty in 
accurately predicting the costs creates a bias toward 
underestimating them in favor of allocating that post-
retirement cash flow to income. This tendency is also in accord 
with the reality that many recent retirees will avoid 
confronting the choice of whether to allocate funds to 
retirement travel and entertainment versus using their hard 
earned dollars to pay for home health aides. 
Though retirees perhaps most commonly choose to consult 
a trust and estate attorney at some point in their later years, 
such attorneys’ focus is similarly diverted and centers upon 
post-mortem disposition of their client’s debts and assets. Any 
allocation of funds to end-of-life care expenses would deplete 
the finite resources available for their clients to distribute after 
death. Even if retirees do receive advice on paying for these 
unfunded health costs, it is likely provided by an elder law 
attorney advising them to shift the expenses to the state. In 
adopting this approach, elder law attorneys are also 
unwittingly shifting control over how this care will be provided 
from the client to the Medicaid funding guidelines adopted by 
their particular state. 
This absence of guidance from financial advisors and 
attorneys usually leaves seniors unprepared to direct or fund 
their own end-of-life care. Clients nearing retirement age may 
be wholly unaware that Medicare coverage of long-term care 
expenses is extremely limited and that funding restrictions 
often entirely eliminate home-based care as an option.81 
Seniors lack guidance as to the complications and undesirable 
financial aspects of Medicaid qualification, but this is often the 
only option that remains for retirees who are financially 
unprepared for long-term care expenses. Further, the void 
created by this lack of guidance often leaves seniors 
uninformed as to their choices for where their end-of-life care 
will take place and unaware of options that do not involve 
institutionalization. 
 
 
81. Vincent Mor et al., The Revolving Door of Rehospitalization from 
Skilled Nursing Facilities, 29 HEALTH AFF. 57 (2010). 
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With proper planning and guidance, many seniors will be 
able to take advantage of a wide range of intermediate care 
options to avoid nursing home care, including adult daycare 
programs and personal care services that can be provided in 
the home. Seniors who have actively engaged in planning for 
end-of-life expenses will find that institutionalization in a 
nursing home is not the only avenue open to them. Remaining 
in the home, which is a primary goal for most retirees,82 is 
possible for seniors who are informed and prepared to control 
their own end-of-life care. 
 
VI. Initiating the Dialogue on End-of-Life Choices 
 
The absence of guidance by financial advisors and 
attorneys is a contributing factor to the lack of preparedness 
among many seniors when it comes to funding post-retirement 
medical expenses, but the unfortunate reality is that seniors 
themselves help perpetuate this planning gap by largely 
avoiding the conversation. There is a cognitive dissonance 
among the aging baby boomer population, in that they wish to 
retain control and independence,83 yet they often remain in 
denial of the need to take the required steps to create the plans 
necessary to remain in command of their end-of-life medical 
care.84 
This dichotomy is natural because, while baby boomers 
crave financial independence and control, and want to ensure 
that their children are provided for, they shy away from 
discussions that focus upon the inevitable physical and mental 
deterioration that could prevent them from achieving these 
ideals. The remainder of this article will advance the theory 
that the two halves of this dichotomy can work in conjunction 
 
82. Barbara J. Edlund et al., Long-Term Care Planning for Baby 
Boomers: Addressing an Uncertain Future, ONLINE J. ISSUES NURSING (May 
31, 2003), 
http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPe
riodicals/OJIN/TableofContents/Volume82003/No2May2003/CarePlanningfor
BabyBoomers.html. 
83. Id. 
84. Lois A. Vitt, Consumers’ Financial Decisions and the Psychology of 
Values, J. FIN. SERVS. PROFESSIONALS, Nov. 2004, at 68, 69. 
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in order to encourage seniors to engage in meaningful dialogue 
with advisors to plan for financing end-of-life care. By 
appealing to the sense of accountability and individualism that 
is the hallmark of this generation,85 society can motivate the 
baby boomer population to regain control over the fiscal choices 
that will define their end-of-life medical care. 
 
A. Imposing Filial Support Liability to Motivate Planning 
Among Retiree-Clients 
 
Today, twenty-nine states have filial support statutes on 
their books under which financially capable adult children can 
be held responsible for the unpaid medical bills of their 
indigent parents, including nursing home bills.86 The statutes 
are enforceable even against the children of elderly individuals 
who have not planned for end-of-life care and become eligible to 
rely upon Medicaid to fund long-term care expenses.87 Although 
these statutes are rarely enforced and Medicaid continues to 
fund most extended nursing home stays in the United States, 
modern budgetary constraints caused by the rising costs of 
nursing home care coupled with the economic recession that 
began in 2008 have compelled nursing homes to examine 
alternate funding methods.88 Rather than seek Medicaid 
reimbursement, some nursing homes have sought enforcement 
of these filial support statutes to collect payment for nursing 
home care from the adult children of elderly nursing home 
residents.89 As the baby boomer generation ages and imposes a 
greater strain upon the Medicaid system, it is likely that more 
nursing homes will begin to regularly seek enforcement of 
 
85. See generally LEONARD STEINHORN, THE GREATER GENERATION: IN 
DEFENSE OF THE BABY BOOM LEGACY (2006). 
86. Katherine C. Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the Modern Era: 
Domestic and International Comparison of Enforcement Practices for Laws 
Requiring Adult Children to Support Indigent Parents, 20 ELDER L.J. 
(forthcoming Fall 2012) (manuscript at 8) (on file with Penn. State eLibrary). 
87. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4603(a)(1) (2005) (permitting enforcement 
of the filial support law even if the indigent adult is a “public charge”); see, 
e.g., Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am. v. Pittas, 2012 PA Super 96, 46 A.3d 
719 (2012). 
88. See Pearson, supra note 86. 
89. Id. 
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these statutes. 
To illustrate, in May 2012, a Pennsylvania court required 
that the adult child of an indigent nursing home resident pay 
an unpaid nursing home bill of approximately $93,000.90 The 
defendant’s mother had no choice but to leave nursing home 
bills unpaid while her application for Medicaid, which was still 
pending at trial, was being considered.91 The Pennsylvania 
appellate court agreed with the trial court that the elderly 
woman’s son was liable under the filial support statute 
regardless of whether the Medicaid application was eventually 
approved.92 This is because, under the Pennsylvania law, the 
spouse, children, and parents of an indigent person have the 
responsibility to “care for and maintain or financially assist 
[that] indigent person, regardless of whether the indigent 
person is a public charge.”93 
Although the Pennsylvania statute provides an exception 
for individuals who are financially unable to provide the legally 
mandated assistance,94 this provision did not exempt the adult 
child in Pittas who, while solvent, had an annual income of 
approximately $85,000 and claimed his personal expenses 
rendered him unable to satisfy the $93,000 debt.95 
Filial responsibility was imposed in the Pittas case despite 
the absence of fault on the part of the defendant96—but this has 
not always been the norm. Though enforcement of the statute 
has been rare, as mentioned above, in Presbyterian Medical 
Center v. Budd,97 the Pennsylvania courts imposed filial 
responsibility upon the adult daughter of an indigent woman 
when the court found that the daughter had engaged in a type 
of Medicaid planning that directly caused her mother’s 
indigence.98 In this case, the daughter used her power of 
attorney to transfer over $100,000 of her elderly mother’s 
 
90. Pittas, 2012 PA Super 96, 46 A.3d at 724. 
91. Id. at 723. 
92. See id. at 722. 
93. 23 PA. CONN. STAT. ANN. § 4603(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
94. 23 PA. CONN. STAT. ANN. § 4603(a)(2)(i). 
95. Pittas, 2012 PA Super 96, 46 A.3d at 722-23. 
96. Id. 
97. 2003 PA Super 323, 832 A.2d 1066. 
98. See id. ¶ 28, 832 A.2d at 1077. 
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assets into her own accounts in order to cause her mother to 
qualify for Medicaid coverage.99 When the elderly woman’s 
Medicaid application was denied, the nursing home attempted 
to collect the unpaid bills under theories of breach of contract 
and fraudulent transfer.100 Both arguments were rejected by 
the court in its decision to rely solely upon the filial support 
statute.101 
While fault is not an element of Pennsylvania’s filial 
support law, the court discussed the defendant’s improper 
appropriation of her mother’s assets in analyzing the elements 
of the statute.102 The court found that the defendant’s transfer 
of over $100,000 to her personal accounts rendered her mother 
indigent and the defendant financially capable in the same 
transaction, thus allowing the court to impose liability.103 
Pennsylvania is only one of twenty-nine states to maintain 
a filial support statute, but the state’s rare enforcement of the 
law is still much more frequent than in the twenty-eight other 
states where enforcement is possible.104 This article does not 
intend to suggest that imposition of filial liability is an 
appropriate means to finance the end-of-life medical expenses 
of seniors, though enforcement of the law in limited 
circumstances would serve to raise awareness among the aging 
baby boomer population. Widespread national media coverage 
of the Pittas case has alerted many to the possibility that these 
laws could be enforced,105 but enforcement is still viewed as a 
fluke occurrence that is not likely to be repeated. Eliminating 
the perception that these statutes are antiquated and unlikely 
to be enforced through regular enforcement where, as in Budd, 
some degree of fault can be demonstrated, could provide baby 
boomers with the necessary deterrent to spur planning for end-
of-life care. 
 
 
 
99. Id. ¶ 3, 832 A.2d at 1069. 
100. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 832 A.2d at 1069. 
101. Id. ¶ 29, 832 A.2d at 1077. 
102. Id. ¶ 18, 832 A.2d at 1076. 
103. Id. 
104. See Pearson, supra note 86, at 17. 
105. Id. at 21-22. 
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By causing baby boomers to become alert to the possibility 
that filial support obligations could be imposed upon their 
children, society can appeal to the individualism and sense of 
accountability that is characteristically found among members 
of this generation.106 The idea of leaving large debts to their 
children likely will have more immediacy and be more 
disturbing to a boomer, in contrast to the more nebulous idea 
that their generation may leave this burden to the entirety of 
the next generation. To avoid the real possibility of imposing 
liability upon their children, baby boomers may be more willing 
to engage their advisors in a discussion about managing their 
eventual physical and mental deterioration and the allocation 
of resources necessary to effectively control the course of their 
own end-of-life care. 
Not only will selective enforcement of filial support 
statutes encourage baby boomers to engage in meaningful 
planning dialogue with their financial advisors, it could serve 
as the germ of an empowering message of hope and control that 
financial advisors and attorneys alike can share with their 
aging clients. These clients’ general aversion to discussing end-
of-life decisions contributes enormously to the difficulty 
experienced by advisors who wish to generate awareness of the 
need to financially prepare for funding end-of-life care. By 
focusing on the need for seniors to take responsibility for their 
own future liabilities, financial advisors can impart a message 
of hope and possibility to their clients, rather than 
discouraging and alienating these clients through forced 
discussion of their future infirmities. 
 
B. Changing the Content of the Planning Dialogue 
 
Because seniors value the ability to maintain autonomy 
and control in the final years of their lives so greatly, the 
abhorrent prospect of institutionalization tends to mask the 
vision of hope and possibility that can be found in the long-
term care planning landscape. Instead of focusing on the 
negative aspects of long-term care late in life, advisors can 
pitch proper planning to their clients as an opportunity to 
 
106. See generally STEINHORN, supra note 85. 
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ensure that they maintain the greatest possible degree of 
control over their care. 
While it is impossible to plan for or predict every scenario, 
fulsome end-of-life planning can ensure that the course of a 
senior’s care most closely resembles that which he or she 
chooses to design. Seniors who are reluctant to leave the 
financial liability for long-term care expenses to their children 
will be equally unwilling to allow these children to become 
solely responsible for the burden of making the decisions 
regarding the course of their care. 
As discussed above, the adult children of seniors are very 
likely to end up providing some level of informal in-home care 
for their parents.107 These adult children may have motives 
that conflict with the end-of-life choices preferred by their 
parents, in that they might not have the time or resources to 
provide the in-home care needed by their elderly parents.108 
The lost opportunity costs and lack of training in effective care 
giving, outlined in Part II,109 means that these adult children 
will eventually become unable to continue providing informal 
care and, in many cases, will be forced to resort to 
institutionalizing their elderly parents in nursing homes. 
Seniors can avoid this result with proper financial 
planning for professional in-home care. When seniors have the 
funds necessary to finance their own care, there is often no 
need for adult children to forego wages or their own familial 
responsibilities to provide their parents with informal care. 
This allows seniors to retain the control and autonomy they 
desire instead of relinquishing independence by transferring 
responsibility to adult children with potentially conflicting 
motivations. 
Translating awareness of the need to plan for end-of-life 
care into an empowering and hopeful message for seniors will 
change the way retirees look at end-of-life planning. By 
structuring the dialogue as a way to plan for retaining 
autonomy and control late in life, advisors can help seniors 
recognize end-of-life planning as a path toward avoiding the 
 
107. See Byrne et al., supra note 30, at 1205. 
108. Id. at 1232. 
109. See supra Part II. 
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institutionalization that they dread. Allocating sufficient 
resources toward end-of-life expenses can allow these seniors to 
take advantage of the home and community based health and 
personal care services available outside of the Medicaid-
financed path. Though HCBS allows seniors to maintain ties 
with their families and social networks, with proper planning 
these families and social networks will not be obligated to 
become the HCBS program. 
 
C. The Professional Duty to Begin the Dialogue on End-of-Life 
Choices 
 
Advisors also have a professional responsibility, and 
perhaps even a legal duty, to engage their clients in these 
planning discussions.110 Lawsuits against advisors who have 
improperly omitted end-of-life planning strategies from a 
client’s overall financial plan are uncommon today. However, 
the increasing costs of health care coupled with the possibility 
of more stringently enforced filial support laws indicate that 
this liability may become much more common in the future. 
Attorneys, who undeniably act as fiduciaries, have a 
professional responsibility to advise their clients of the need for 
long-term care planning as a corollary to estate or Medicaid 
planning.111 Financial planners may similarly be held liable for 
failing to properly advise their clients with regard to long-term 
care planning as the scope of fiduciary liability continues to 
expand.112 While most cases imposing liability upon financial 
advisors under fiduciary liability theories involve improper 
investment advice surrounding annuity sales or investment 
strategy,113 the classification of a financial advisor as a 
fiduciary in any context is significant because of its 
 
110. Robert D. Hayes et al., What Attorneys Should Know About Long-
Term Care Insurance, 7 ELDER L.J. 1, 3 (1999). 
111. See id. 
112. See W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. v. Graben, 233 S.W.3d 360, 373-
74 (2007) (finding a relationship of trust and confidence existed to support a 
fiduciary relationship between the financial advisor and client). 
113. See Sally Balch Hurme, Who’s in the Batter’s Box?: Regulating and 
Litigating Unsuitable Sales of Variable Annuities, 1 PHOENIX. L. REV. 365, 
423 (2008). 
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precedential value. 
Broker-dealers and investment advisors have been 
categorized as fiduciaries in certain circumstances, depending 
upon the degree of trust and confidence that the client places in 
her advisor.114 Where a fiduciary duty is found to exist, the 
advisor has a “heightened duty” to act on the client’s behalf.115 
The client in the fiduciary relationship can, in some instances, 
bring an individual cause of action against a fiduciary who 
breaches this duty by failing to give proper advice.116 When 
financial advisors and attorneys acting in a fiduciary capacity 
ignore the need to plan for clients’ unfunded end-of-life care 
expenses, they invite potential lawsuits from these clients 
alleging that failure to provide such planning advice 
constitutes a breach of their fiduciary obligations. This is 
because the analogy between imposing fiduciary liability for 
improper investment advice, and imposing this liability for 
failing to advise on a planning issue as critical as planning for 
long-term care, could easily be accepted in court. 
 
 
114. See ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES 
ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 11 (2008), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR556.html. 
115. See generally Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-
Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 719-29 (2010). While 
investment advisors are classified as fiduciaries under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 
180, 191 (1963), broker-dealers are only considered to act in a fiduciary 
capacity in limited circumstances. See Laby, supra note 115, at 719-29. 
Broker-dealers are often able to take advantage of an exception in the 
Investment Advisers Act because they commonly provide investment advice 
only as an incidental aspect of their duties. George Steven Swan, The Law 
and Economics of Interprofessional Frontier Skirmishing: Financial Planning 
Association v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 16 U. MIAMI BUS. L. 
REV. 75, 106 (2007). However, broker-dealers who have investment discretion 
over client accounts, or who provide more than incidental investment advice, 
will often be held to a fiduciary standard. Laby, supra note 115, at 704-05, 
715. Broker-dealers act in several capacities, one of which is the “broker” 
capacity in which part of their role involves buying and selling on behalf of 
their clients, rather than simply trading securities with their own customers. 
See id. at 2-3. Broker-dealers who act in a “broker” capacity act as agents for 
their clients and are, therefore, more likely to be held to the higher fiduciary 
standard. See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker 
Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 710 (2010). 
116. See Hurme, supra note 113. 
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In Western Reserve Life Assurance, for example, a Texas 
court found that an advisor had a fiduciary duty to provide 
appropriate investment advice to his clients and that he 
breached this duty.117 The plaintiffs in Western Reserve were 
relatively unsophisticated investors who testified that they 
relied heavily upon the advice of the defendant in their 
financial planning.118 While the plaintiffs had broadly 
described their financial goals, they placed substantial trust in 
the appropriateness of the defendant’s investment advice.119 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that no 
fiduciary relationship could be found because the activities 
between the parties constituted arm’s-length business 
transactions.120 In its holding, the court stressed the 
importance of the advisor’s role in finding that he “acted as a 
financial advisor whom the [c]lients trusted to monitor the 
performance of their investments and recommend appropriate 
financial plans to them.”121 According to the court, when the 
defendant assumed the role of investment advisor, managing 
and monitoring his client’s investments, he himself caused the 
relationship to elevate to a fiduciary level.122 
Though the financial plans in Western Reserve were not 
related specifically to funding post-retirement medical 
expenses, the reasoning could easily be expanded to apply to 
advisors neglecting to plan for end-of-life care. Therefore, by 
failing to recommend that clients plan for financing end-of-life 
care, advisors expose themselves to the potential expansion of 
this line of reasoning to include failure to provide advice with 
regard to unfunded post-retirement health care expenses. This 
possibility of exposure to professional and legal liability for 
failing to properly advise clients in planning to fund end-of-life 
care provides a compelling argument that will motivate 
advisors to engage in comprehensive planning discussions with 
their clients. If the deterrent effect of selectively enforcing filial 
support statutes becomes effective, seniors themselves will be 
 
117. W. Reserve Life Assurance Co., 233 S.W.3d at 374. 
118. Id. at 370. 
119. Id. at 367. 
120. Id. at 374. 
121. Id. (emphasis added). 
122. See id. 
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equally motivated by the fear that they will burden their 
children by failing to properly account for the cost of their end-
of-life care. 
 
D. Dual Motivation for Crafting a Comprehensive End-of-Life 
Care Plan 
 
These dual deterrent motivators, working in conjunction, 
will serve to force the dialogue between advisors and seniors, 
even if the discussion begins by focusing only on a “necessary 
evil” that must be addressed. Discussion of the “evils” inherent 
in failing to plan for end-of-life care can provide enough of a 
spark to ignite the fuller planning dialogue. 
Convincing aging clients that planning for end-of-life care 
is “the right thing to do” is only a starting point for providing 
seniors with the tools necessary to direct the course of their 
future long-term care. Advisors who are motivated by fear of 
professional liability can initiate an empowering discussion 
that emphasizes the paradigms of familial and fiscal 
responsibility among their baby boomer clients, and, in the 
process, may remove some of the stigma attached to end-of-life 
planning. Through more in-depth discussion of long-term care 
planning, advisors can help seniors avoid not only the financial 
burden they could leave to their children, but also the 
emotional burden imposed when children are forced to 
determine the course of their parents’ end-of-life care, after the 
seniors themselves can no longer make the relevant decisions. 
Raising the long-term care issue itself is necessary, but it 
is not a sufficient solution to the problem, which can only be 
solved through a dialogue in which both advisor and client are 
invested in creating a comprehensive plan. A fulsome 
discussion of end-of-life planning opens the door for advisors to 
move beyond solutions involving insurance and financing, to 
the use of detailed living wills and advanced directives to help 
seniors control the course of their own care late in life. Opening 
the door to the consideration of financial burdens will not only 
allow seniors to avoid indigence late in life, but can lead to 
development of this all-encompassing, comprehensive end-of-
life plan that will leave seniors feeling prepared and in control 
of their future care. 
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VII.  Conclusion 
 
Since Medigap’s at-home recovery option was defunded, 
Medicare-eligible seniors have been largely unable to access 
HCBS programs, leaving them with little choice but to receive 
long-term care in nursing homes. The post-Olmstead Medicaid 
experience has illustrated the ability of states to reduce 
institutional expenses by developing and implementing 
comprehensive HCBS programs. In a post-MIPPA world, the 
next logical step is increasing access to HCBS among the non-
indigent senior population by helping them create financial 
plans that would allow these seniors to access HCBS without 
government assistance. 
Despite advancing HCBS programs, attorneys and 
financial planners currently have little incentive to initiate a 
conversation with clients about planning for end-of-life care 
and making use of HCBS. This lack of motivation, coupled with 
client’s reluctance to discuss end-of-life care, has led to a 
planning gap among retirees that leaves many unprepared to 
fund their own end-of-life care. Selective enforcement of filial 
support statutes in cases where some degree of fault can be 
demonstrated can motivate baby boomer clients to engage their 
advisors in a planning dialogue to avoid leaving the debt for 
end-of-life care to their children. 
Further, increasing the awareness of advisors’ professional 
duty to engage in this planning dialogue, as well as the 
possibility of fiduciary liability for failing to do so, can provide 
motivation for these advisors to initiate the conversation. 
These dual motivators can work together to create an 
environment in which end-of-life planning discussions can be 
empowering and positive as advisors and clients work together 
to develop comprehensive plans for end-of-life care. Forcing 
this dialogue to the surface can provide baby boomer retirees 
the independence and control they crave and allow them to 
make responsible choices about their end-of-life care plans. 
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